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11. 
INTRODUCTION 
In their Reply Brief, Appellants correctly point out that Respondent/Cross-Appellant's 
arguments are not radically different from arguments presented to the district court on the State's 
statutory employment Motion for Summary Judgment. This observation is accurate to the extent the 
State is emphasizing those applicable statutes and case law on statutory employment which should 
have lead the district court to the conclusion that Mr. Ewing was a statutory employee of the State 
at the time of his accident. Since this Court utilizes the same standard of review as the lower court 
on a motion for summary judgment, it is appropriate that the State's analysis of the statutory 
employer issue be presented to this Court in a similar context. 
This same standard ofreview applies to this Court's review of the district court's decision 
granting summary judgment to the State under the recreational use statute issue, I. C. § 36-1604. 
From the State's perspective, the district court correctly analyzed the undisputed facts in this matter 
in conjunction with the statuto1y language of the recreational use statute and applied it appropriately. 
The Appellants appear bewildered by the fact the lower court deemed Mr. Ewing to be 
"recreating" at the time of his incident. They seem equally perplexed by the fact that at the same 
time the State would argue Ewing is its statutory employee. Appellants would apparently ask this 
Court to ignore the fact that Mr. Ewing obtained worker's compensation benefits for the incident at 
issue from his employer, which was working under a subcontract with a party which had contracted 
with the State. Regardless of the Appellants' puzzlement, Mr. Ewing qualified as both a statutory 
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employee of the State ofldaho and was subject to the provisions of the recreational use statute when 
he was injured. 
Thereby, it is respectfully submitted that this Court affirm the trial court's decision granting 
the State's motion for summary judgment on the recreational use issue. Should the Court deem Mr. 
Ewing's activities outside the scope of the recreational use statute, it is then requested that this Court 
find that Mr. Ewing was injured while a statutory employee of the State, making it immune from 
third party liability in this matter. 
I. 
THE STATE WAS A CATEGORY 1 STATUTORY EMPLOYER 
OF APPELLANT AT THE TIME OF HIS INCIDENT 
As set forth in the Undisputed Facts of the Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ewing 
was within the course and scope of his employment with North Star Enterprises, Inc. (North Star) 
on June 20, 2006, the day of his accident. North Star was a subcontractor to Scarsella Brothers 
(Scarsella), the contractor hired under a contract with the IDT to perform construction and 
realignment work on U. S. Highway 95. Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief, pp. 4-5. 
At the time of his incident, Ewing was on a break from his employment with North Star when 
he fell at the Mineral Mountain Rest Area (Mineral Mountain). Mineral Mountain is located within 
the construction zone of the IDT contract with Scarsella. Id., p. 5. As a result of his accident, Ewing 
filed for and received worker's compensation benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Id., p. 6. 
RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 2 
In their Reply, Appellants attempt to put a simplistic spin on the category 1 and category 2 
definitions ofa statutory employer, first enumerated in Venters v. Sorrento Delaware, Inc., 141 Idaho 
245, 180 P.3d 392 (2005). Appellants opined that "if an employer is injured on the job and his 
immediate employer has no worker's compensation and the prime contractor on the job has worker's 
compensation coverage, then that contractor becomes the statutory employer." Appellants' Reply 
Brief, p. 2. Thus, under Appellants' category 1 statutory employer analysis, a category 1 employer 
goes no further than the "prime" contractor. Since North Star is a subcontractor of Scarsella in this 
instance, Appellants would like this Court to stop its statutory employer analysis with Scarsella. 
Appellants have either intentionally fashioned their argument to disregard or unintentionally 
overlooked the fact that Venters defined a category 1 statutory employer to extend to those who hire 
both contractors and subcontractors alike. This broader definition is contained within I. C. § 72-
216(1) & (2) and is likewise confirmed in Robinson v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 76 P.3d 
951 (2003), in which this Court extended the statutory employer immunity to employers who 
subcontract services out. 
As discussed extensively in the prior briefing, this Court clearly also extended the immunity 
under Idaho's worker's compensation statutes in the subcontractor context to the IDT in the 
Fuhriman v. State, Dept. of Transp., 143 Idaho 800, 153 P.3d 480 (2007). As discussed in the 
Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief, p. 17, this Court stated it had summarized the I. C. § 72-223 
category 1 protection for employers to include "employers who make use of a contractor's or 
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subcontractor's employers." Fuhriman, 153 P.3d at 485 (citations omitted). (Emphasis added). 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant's category I argument is flawed under the concept that 
a statutory employment relationship cannot exist past the "prime" contractor. Clearly, Idaho's 
worker's compensation statutes reflect and appellate case law has held that a statutory employment 
relationship exists through entities, including the IDT, which utilized both contractors and 
subcontractors on construction projects. 
Appellants also spend an inordinate amount of time arguing that the IDT is not a category 
2 statutory employer. The State has never argued, neither to the district court nor during the course 
of this appeal, that it is a category 2 statutory employer of Mr. Ewing. Hence, Appellants' argument 
in this regard is inconsequential and their reliance on cases such as Robinson v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 
supra, and Cordova v. Bonneville County Joint School District No. 93, 07.16 ISCR 666 (2007 
Opinion No. I 00) is misplaced. 
As previously set forth in Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief, the true test in determining 
whether the State was the statutory employer of Mr. Ewing at the time of his accident is whether the 
State would have been called upon to provide worker's compensation benefits if either North Star 
or Scarsella failed to do so. The answer is an unequivocal and resounding yes. 
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II. 
THE UNDISPUTED FACTS IN THIS CASE MAKE EWING SUBJECT TO BOTH THE 
RECREATIONAL USE STATUTE AND THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY OF THE 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION STATUTES 
While the end result may appear contradictory, the undisputed facts in this case show that Mr. 
Ewing was both recreating and working at the time of his incident. Thereby, he was subject to the 
provisions of both the recreational use statute and the exclusive remedy of the Idaho worker's 
compensation statutes as a statutory employee of the State when injured. 
As the lower court correctly perceived, the Idaho recreational use statute encompasses a very 
broad spectrum of activities. 1 While Ewing was taking a break from his employment with North 
Star, he was injured by his own admission as he walked across the Mineral Mountain Rest Area to 
use a picnic table. At that point in time, the State ofidaho as the owner of the rest area owed no duty 
of care to Mr. Ewing to keep the premises safe or to give a warning of a dangerous condition, absent 
the showing of willful and wanton misconduct. The rest area is open to the public and it is open free 
of charge. Thus, the activity Mr. Ewing was engaged in at the specific time he was injured falls 
under the purview of the Idaho recreational use statute. 
Should this Court upholds the lower court's decision to grant the State's summm·y judgment 
pursua11t to I. C. § 36-1604, the analysis needs to go no further. However, while the State believes 
1 Under the Appella11ts' "parallel universe" argument in their Reply Brief, it is 
conceivable that Mr. Ewing would be subject to the Idaho recreational use statute for his 
"birdwatching" activity. 
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the lower court correctly perceived and analyzed Mr. Ewing's activities under the recreational use 
statute, it likewise believes that Mr. Ewing is subject to the exclusive remedy of the Idaho worker's 
compensation laws pursuant to the undisputed facts of this case. While Mr. Ewing was recreating 
at the time of his incident, he was likewise within the course and scope of his employment at the 
time of the incident. Based on the analysis set forth in section I above, and previously discussed in 
Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief, should this Court decide to examine this matter beyond the trial 
court's decision granting the State's summary judgment as to the recreational use statute, the State 
believes the Appellants' complaint fails nonetheless pursuant to Mr. Ewing's status as a statutory 
employee of the State at the time of his accident. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set forth in Respondent/Cross-
Appellant's Brief, the State of Idaho, Department of Transportation respectfully submits that the 
district court's order granting the State's motion for swnmary judgment be affirmed. In the 
alternative, the State respectfully submits that this Court reverse the district court's order denying 
the State's motion for swnmary judgment that the State is a category I statutory employer of the 
Plaintiff. 
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DATED this ;bl_ day of April, 2008. 
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC 
By: 
Michael E. Kelly, Ofth Firm 
Attorneys for Respondent/Cross-Appellant 
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